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MARBURY AND THE RETREAT FROM 
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
Larry D. Kramer* 
I. INTRODUCTION: EVER SINCE MARBURY 
For many long years, conventional wisdom had it that Mar-
bury v. Madison invented the modern practice of judicial review, 
by which we mean a practice of regularly submitting constitu-
tional disputes to courts for final resolution in the context of or-
dinary litigation. Most lawyers and judges (and a surprising 
number of academics) apparently still hold this view-the Su-
preme Court itself being among the most persistent offenders in 
this regard. "No doubt the political branches have a role in in-
terpreting and applying the Constitution," Chief Justice 
Rehnquist recently wrote, "but ever since Marbury this Court 
has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text. "1 
Rarely cited before the second half of the twentieth century, 
Marbury has become the keystone to the present Court's juris-
prudence, the main source of its claim to supremacy and some-
times exclusivity in the domain of constitutional law and inter-
pretation. 
Those who follow historical scholarship have a different 
view of the case: one in which Marbury confirmed an existing 
practice that might be called "judicial review" but that bears lit-
tle resemblance to what passes for review today and that cer-
tainly reco9nized nothing like the modern doctrine of judicial 
supremacy. Yet the relationship between Marbury and the 
* Associate Dean for Research and Academics and Russell D. Niles Professor of 
Law, New York University School of Law. The material below is drawn from a forthcom-
ing book, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (2004), which offers a more comprehensive account of the origins and develop-
ment of judicial review from its beginnings in colonial society until today. 
I. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616 (2000). 
2. Chief credit for initiating the revisionist understanding of Marbury belongs to 
Sylvia Snowiss, who developed the argument in her book JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE 
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1990). Other scholars had previously argued that the mod-
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modern practice nevertheless remains important. Revisionist 
scholars have, for the most part, assumed that an idea like judi-
cial supremacy was not yet available when Marshall wrote, rea-
soning that it emerged only in subsequent decades.3 Marbury, in 
this conception, reflected an immature state in the development 
of judicial power that was fleshed out and refined with experi-
ence. Though many of the scholars who make this sort of argu-
ment are not particular fans of the judiciary, their work has nev-
ertheless contributed to a new mythology in which judicial 
supremacy is treated as the logical and inexorable endpoint of a 
beneficent progress.4 
In fact, as I will argue below, the claim that judges had spe-
cial authority for interpreting the Constitution and that judicial 
decisions were meant to be final and binding on everyone was 
fully developed by the middle of the 1790s. Politically controver-
sial from the start, this position was decisively rejected by the 
American public in the elections of 1800 and 1802. Read in con-
text, Marbury is best understood as a retreat from judicial su-
premacy-a self-conscious backing away from the claim that 
constitutional interpretation is a uniquely legal and judicial re-
sponsibility. The current Supreme Court's reliance on Marshall's 
opinion for this very claim could hardly be more ironic. 
II. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE ORIGINS 
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The revisionist story of Marbury begins before the Constitu-
tion was adopted, before even Independence was declared, for 
colonial Americans brought with them from England a concept 
of constitutionalism that provided the crucial background condi-
tions in which an idea of judicial review would develop. The 
ern practice of judicial review emerged later than Marbury, though none with the sophis-
tication of Snowiss's account. See CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (rev. ed. 1994); J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG ROBE: 
THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICA (1989). l published my own version of 
this story in The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 4 (2001), which is significantly reworked and elaborated in a forthcoming book, 
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, cited in the introductory note. 
3. See infra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
4. See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, Enslaved to Judicial Supremacy?, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 1197, 1197 (1993) ("[f)or most of our history, most Americans have seen the Su-
preme Court as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution, entitled (this side of an 
amendment) to impose its understanding of the Constitution on the states, the other 
branches of the federal government, and the people"); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S 
LAW 34-35 (1996) ("interpretive authority is already distributed by history" which 
"shows that our judges have final interpretive authority"). 
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critical feature of this eighteenth-century British constitution 
was that it rested on the consent of the governed. In American 
eyes, this meant the constitution was superior to any action by 
the government, which had no authority unilaterally to alter or 
abrogate its terms. The British constitution was law made by the 
people to govern their governors. It was interpreted and en-
forced by the people themselves, speaking through the full array 
of eighteenth-century devices available to register the will of the 
community: elections, petitions, conventions, juries, mobs, and 
the like. There was no notion of judicial review because courts, 
like every other agency of government, were the constitution's 
targets: the regulated. Final responsibility for interpreting and 
enforcing constitutional law necessarily lay outside the govern-
ment, in the community itself. 
This system, which I and others have elsewhere named 
"popular constitutionalism," rested on social conditions and 
practices whose significance becomes evident only in hindsight. 
Chief among these was a distinction between law and politics 
that ordinary citizens as well as community leaders could recog-
nize and understand and that both groups took seriously. In ad-
dition, the world of the eighteenth-century constitution was one 
in which intense constitutional conflict was rare-a product, 
among other things, of the narrowness of fundamental law and 
the limited role of government. What conflicts arose were kept 
in check by a "well born" elite to which ordinary citizens de-
ferred. Deference was crucial not only in keeping popular action 
under control, but also in helping contemporaries distinguish le-
gitimate extralegal opposition from an ordinary riot. Notwith-
standing its popular basis, the British constitution was a funda-
mentally conservative institution, a means for ordinary people 
guided by their social betters to preserve customary ways of do-
ing things and to counter abuses by the Crown. 
The American Revolution arose out of a series of disagree-
ments over the meaning and proper interpretation of this consti-
tution. It was, in essence, a rebellion fought to preserve an exist-
ing understanding of constitutionalism, an understanding 
Americans did not suddenly decide to abandon or repudiate 
upon achieving independence. Written constitutions took their 
place within and alongside those portions of the existing consti-
tution that had not necessarily been abrogated by the break with 
Great Britain, and substantive doctrines and arguments from be-
fore the Revolution continued to apply. More important for pre-
sent purposes, everyone took for granted that responsibility for 
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constitutional interpretation and enforcement remained with the 
community. 
All that notwithstanding, the Revolution inevitably pro-
duced changes that exerted pressure on existing practices of con-
stitutional law, and from these emerged a first approximation of 
judicial review. Suddenly America's legislatures found them-
selves doing far more than before: a product not only of Britain's 
withdrawal, but also of war and of new demands for government 
action in a variety of domains. Together with the greater explic-
itness of written constitutions, this created many more opportu-
nities for constitutional conflict than had formerly existed. Plus, 
the process of upholding the British constitution against the 
claims of Parliamentary sovereignty had deepened Americans' 
commitment to a constitution's basis in popular sovereignty-a 
reaction enhanced in tum by the experience of drafting new con-
stitutions in the states. Infused with Revolutionary fervor, the 
American understanding of constitutionalism became less con-
servative and more reformist in nature, again increasing the like-
lihood of constitutional conflict. 
The men who crafted America's new constitutions offered a 
variety of devices to handle the increased volume of constitu-
tional law and disagreement. These included everything from 
provisions for formal amendment to councils of censors and 
councils of revision to periodic conventions of the people, execu-
tive vetoes, and more. A few people suggested a role for courts. 
Reasoning from within the still unchallenged premises of popu-
lar constitutionalism, they argued that because a constitution 
embodied the voice of the people, its obligations and limitations 
were binding on every branch of the government. A legislature 
that enacted a law inconsistent with constitutional commands 
was acting unlawfully; it might be the people's responsibility to 
mete out punishment, but a court that enforced this law was 
making itself an accomplice to the same illegal act. By instead 
refusing to enforce unconstitutional laws, judges could serve not 
only as the people's faithful agent but also as their proxy, supply-
ing a peaceful remedy that might make popular action from the 
community unnecessary. 
The argument, in other words, was that judges no less than 
anyone else should resist unconstitutional laws. This obligation 
did not arise from any special competence that judges possessed 
as judges, and it certainly was not based on the notion that a 
constitution was just so much law subject to judicial control. It 
was, rather, simply another instance of the right and responsibil-
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ity of every citizen to oppose unconstitutional government ac-
tion. 
This embryonic version of judicial review played only a 
small role in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and virtually 
none in the subsequent debate over ratification. The idea was 
novel and not widely publicized, and it had proved controversial 
and unreliable in the few cases in which it had been raised. The 
Framers did assign judges a role policing unconstitutional state 
laws-something acceptable to opponents of a strong federal 
government precisely because a judicial check was thought to be 
weak and tenuous- but they otherwise paid scant attention to 
judicial review. When it came to policing federal action, the 
Founders focused on more established, better known ways of 
preserving constitutional limits, such as a council of revision 
(which they rejected) and an array of now-familiar political 
checks including bicameralism, federalism, and an executive 
veto. 
None of this is surprising once we recognize that the move-
ment to adopt a new Federal Constitution was not a rejection of 
popular constitutionalism. On the contrary, the Framers and 
Founders took popular constitutionalism for granted and were 
no more likely to question it than we today would be to question 
our own commitment to a very different notion of democracy. 
Even this formulation is misleading if it implies that something 
was up for grabs, for the principles of popular constitutionalism 
were so widely shared among the Revolutionary generation as to 
be largely invisible. They were background assumptions, a 
shared baseline from which reformers developed their ideas for 
reform. 
The new Constitution was thus an effort made from within a 
system of popular constitutionalism to respond to lessons 
learned since the Revolution. In securing a stable central gov-
ernment, Federalist leaders hoped also to counter some of this 
system's excesses and to restore its balance, at least at the fed-
erallevel.5 Federalists perceived this balance as having been up-
set in the states by the erosion of deference and the rise of a new 
class of less worthy leaders.6 It could be restored, Federalists 
hoped, by two features of the new government. First, the sheer 
5. See Larry Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611,674-75 (1999). 
6. See Gordon S. Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Con-
stitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION 69 (Richard Beeman, Stephen Botein & Edward 
C. Carter, III, eds. 1987). 
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size of federal electoral districts would help to ensure that only 
men of proper character and virtue were elected, thus removing 
a major source of friction and reducing the frequency with which 
questionable laws were enacted.7 Second, separation of powers 
within the government would make it possible to settle whatever 
constitutional disputes might still arise by accommodation 
among the branches, making direct resort to the people unneces-
sary except on rare occasions. 8 
This last point is important and should be emphasized. No 
one in 1789 questioned that, as Madison said in Federalist 49, 
"the people themselves ... as the grantors of the [Constitution's] 
commission, can alone declare its true meaning and enforce its 
observance."9 What Federalist leaders sought were ways to 
minimize the frequency with which this grantor would need to be 
called upon-much as we today try to minimize the frequency of 
litigation by creating opportunities for parties to settle their dis-
putes out of court. But everyone knew where legitimate author-
ity lay if a dispute could not be settled this way: it remained, as 
always, with "the people themselves." 
III. ACCEPTING JUDICIAL REVIEW 
The 1790s were difficult years for the young Republic. The 
Federalists who spearheaded the drive for a new Constitution 
had not misdiagnosed the problem, but they had mistaken the 
cure. Deference was indeed eroding as common people de-
manded to control what their government did, but this was not 
something that could be stopped by making the government 
more distant and elite. Indeed, it was not something that could 
be stopped at all. Terrible strains emerged as Americans divided 
over contentious issues of finance and foreign policy, and politi-
cal leaders on different sides of the issues found themselves 
forced to reach out to the community for support. 1° Former Fed-
7. /d.; JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE 
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 214-27 (1996); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE 
PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN 
FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 46-66 (1990). I have argued elsewhere that this was the 
only aspect of Madison's famous theory of the extended republic that his fellow Framers 
and Founders seem to have comprehended. See Kramer, supra note 5, passim & esp. 658. 
8. The classic cite here is Madison's line of essays in THE FEDERALIST Nos. 49-51, 
though this general point about separation of powers was ubiquitous in the debates sur-
rounding the new Constitution. 
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 339 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
10. See Michael Wallace, Changing Concepts of Party in the United States: New 
York, 1815-1828,74 AM. HIST. REV. 453,455 & n.5 (1968) (citing authorities). 
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eralists and Anti-Federalists reshuffled their alliances as the first 
political parties formed. 
Yet disagreements about Hamilton's bank or the French 
Revolution were themselves byproducts of a more fundamental 
disagreement about the proper role of ordinary citizens in day-
to-day governance. Under the leadership of Jefferson and Madi-
son, Republicans championed an expansive ideal of popular au-
thority, insisting on the people's right to control their representa-
tives at all times and on all issues. Hamilton's Federalists, in 
contrast, became progressively more conservative and anti-
populist, defending a philosophy that acknowledged the political 
power of ordinary citizens on election days but called upon them 
between elections to defer passively and unquestioningly to 
"constituted authorities. "11 This was, in a sense, a logical exten-
sion of the Federalist ideology of the 1780s, but the anti-
democratic strands in Federalist thinking became much more 
pronounced in the 1790s-a product not only of unexpectedly 
fierce political opposition at home but also of fear from watching 
events unfold in France. 
Judicial review was a sideshow in this larger struggle. In-
deed, the main development of the 1790s respecting judicial au-
thority over the Constitution consisted of widespread acceptance 
of the limited argument for review developed in the 1780s. 
Hence, rather than claim authority on the ground that constitu-
tional interpretation is a uniquely judicial task, courts empha-
sized that unconstitutional laws were void and insisted that 
courts were no less obligated than the other branches to attend 
to this fact. As expressed by the Virginia court in the well-known 
case of Kamper v. Hawkins, the constitution applied to the judi-
ciary "as well as" to the other branches, and judges could not 
permit themselves to be made "fit agents" in abetting legislative 
illegality but should instead uphold constitutional values "on be-
half of the people"- though only if the legislative violation was 
"plain and clear. "12 
II. James P. Martin, When Repression is Democratic and Constitutional: The Feder-
alist Theory of Representation and the Sedition Act of 1798, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 117, 130-
76 (1999). 
12. Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cases) 20, 39, 61,65-66, 78-79 (1793) (opin-
ions of St. George Tucker, Spencer Roane, John Tyler). Kamper was the most well 
known and influential decision on judicial review prior to Marbury-partly because it 
came from the respected Virginia court, and partly because it was published in pamphlet 
form and was thus more accessible than other opinions in an age before official reports 
were common. See CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN OOCfRINE OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY 104 (1914); Margaret V. Nelson, The Cases of the Judges: Fact or Fiction?, 
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A. DEPARTMENTALISM 
The emergence of judicial review, even in this limited and 
restrained form, still needed to be fit into a theory of the Consti-
tution. This was accomplished by a "departmental" approach to 
separation of powers, which recognized that all three branches 
might have a say, though always subject to popular oversight ex-
pressed primarily but not exclusively in elections. Madison him-
self was among the earliest and strongest proponents of this ap-
proach. During the 1789 debate over the President's removal 
power, Madison conceded the basic argument for judicial review. 
"I acknowledge, in the ordinary course of government, that the 
exposition of the laws and constitution devolves upon the judi-
cial," he said. It did not follow, however, that judicial decisions 
should therefore acquire any special stature or status: 
But, I beg to know, upon what principle it can be contended 
that any one department draws from the constitution greater 
powers than another, in marking out the limits of the powers 
of the several departments. The constitution is the charter of 
the people to the government; it specifies certain great powers 
as absolutely granted, and marks out the departments to exer-
cise them. If the constitutional boundary of either be brought 
into question, I do not see that any one of these independent 
departments has more right than another to declare their sen-
. h . 13 tlments on t at pomt. 
Thomas Jefferson, who embraced this theory throughout his po-
litical life, 14 expressed the idea succinctly: "[E]ach of the three 
31 VA. L. REV. 243, 251 (1945). 
13. Speech by James Madison to the House of Representatives on the Removal 
Power of the President (June 17, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 232, 238 
(Robert A. Rutledge et al. eds, 1979). See also James Madison, "Helvidius" Number 2 
(August 31, 1793), in 15 PAPERS OF MADISON, supra, at 80, 83 ("It may happen also that 
different independent departments, the legislative and executive, for example, may in the 
exercise of their functions, interpret the constitution differently, and thence lay claim 
each to the same power. This difference of opinion is an inconvenience not entirely to be 
avoided. It results from what may be called, if it be thought fit, a concurrent right to ex-
pound the constitution."). 
14. See DAVID N. MAYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 257-94 (1994). As Mayer observes, Jefferson's emphasis shifted over time-
from an early confidence in the reliability of courts to a late-life belief that federal judges 
were an irresponsible "corps of sappers and miners" working to undermine the Constitu-
tion's careful balancing act. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Ritchie (Dec. 25, 
1820), in 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 169-70 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 
1898). But these were changes in tone that occurred within the same departmentalist 
framework, a framework Jefferson restated on numerous occasions over the course of 
three decades. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Mrs. Adams (Sept. 11, 1804), in 4 
MEMOIRS, CORRESPONDENCE AND MISCELLANIES FROM THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
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departments has equally the right to decide for itself what is its 
duty under the constitution, without regard to what the others 
may have decided for themselves under a similar question." 15 
Kentucky Senator John Breckinridge described how this 
departmental theory would work in practice. "Although ... the 
courts may take upon them to give decisions which impeach the 
constitutionality of a law, and thereby, for a time, obstruct its 
operations," he explained: 
[Y]et I contend that such a law is not the less obligatory be-
cause the organ through which it is to be executed has refused 
its aid. A pertinacious adherence of both departments to their 
opinions, would soon bring the question to issue, in whom the 
sovereign power of legislation resided, and whose construc-
tion of the law-making power should prevail. 16 
By "bring the question to issue," Breckinridge meant that "per-
tinacious adherence" by different branches to conflicting views 
would force the public to decide. Ideally, this would seldom be 
necessary and disputes would be settled (as most disputes were) 
by the branches themselves, without a need for popular interven-
tion. But if a dispute could not be settled and needed authorita-
tive resolution, politics was the proper forum and the people 
were the proper agent. 
B. MARBURY V. MADISON 
John Marshall's opinion in Marbury was not merely consis-
tent with this departmental approach, but explicit in embracing 
its underlying theory of judicial review. Like other writers of the 
period, Marshall began with the principle that the Constitution is 
"a superior, paramount law," and that, therefore, "an act of the 
JEFFERSON 26, 27 (Thomas Jefferson Randolph ed., 1829); Letter from Thomas Jeffer-
son to George Hay (June 2, 1807), in id. at 75, 75; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.H. 
Torrance (June 11, 1815), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra, at 516, 
517-18; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 id. at 140, 
141-42; Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Jarvis Short (Sept. 28, 1820), in id. at 
160, 160-61. 
15. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Spencer Roane (Sept. 6, 1819), in 10 THE 
WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at 140, 142. Jefferson recognized that certain 
questions were, by their very nature, not subject to come before all the branches and 
that, with respect to such questions, one branch or another might be able to act "ulti-
mately and without appeal" (except to the people). See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
William Torrance (June 11, 1815), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF JEFFERSON, supra note 14, at 
517~18. The departmental theory applied to all those questions subject to concurrent ju-
nsdlctwn, and as to these Jefferson felt no compunction leaving things that way and 
made no effort to assign every question to one authority for final resolution. 
16. Speech by John Breckinridge, in 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 179-80 (1802). 
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legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void." 17 He then 
asked, again like other writers, "does [such a law], notwithstand-
ing its invalidity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give it ef-
fect?"18 Though this would seem, "at first view, an absurdity too 
gross to be insisted on,"19 Marshall proposed nevertheless to say 
more and explain why. Then, the famous line: "It is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the 
law is."20 
Read in context, this sentence did not say what, to modern 
eyes, it seems to say when read in isolation. That is, it did not say 
"it is the job of courts, alone, to say what the Constitution 
means." Nor did it say, "it is the job of courts, more so than oth-
ers, to say what the Constitution means." What it said was 
"courts, too, can say what the Constitution means." Marshall 
thus immediately followed his celebrated sentence with the same 
explanation as that previously offered by Republican judges St. 
George Tucker and Spencer Roane in Kamper v. Hawkins. A 
constitution, Tucker had observed a decade earlier is a rule "to 
all the departments of the government." The legislature and ex-
ecutive were obliged to consider it in discharging their responsi-
bilities for making and executing laws. But how, Tucker asked, 
could judges discharge their duty, which was to expound the law, 
"if that which is the supreme law of the land be withheld from 
their view?"21 Roane had agreed with Tucker that it was illogical 
to say that judges must blind themselves to constitutional con-
siderations. "In expounding laws," he observed, 
the judiciary considers every law which relates to the subject: 
would you have them to shut their eyes against that law which 
is of the highest authority of any, or against a part of that law, 
which either by its words or by its spirit, denies to any but the 
people the power to change it?22 
Now listen to Marshall, who virtually plagiarized their opin-
ions in Marbury: 
Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity 
expound and interpret that rule .... Those then who contro-
vert the principle that the constitution is to be considered, in 
17. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (quotes at p. 177). 
18. /d. 
19. !d. 
20. /d. 
21. Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cases) at 78-79. 
22. /d. at 38-39. 
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court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of 
maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the constitu-
tion, and see only the law.23 
Marshall added a textual argument. Federal judicial power 
extends to cases "arising under" the Constitution.24 "Could it 
be," he asked incredulously, "[t]hat a case arising under the con-
stitution should be decided without examining the instrument 
under which it arises?"25 To anyone still unpersuaded of the "ex-
travagan[ ce ]" of such a supposition, Marshall offered a list of 
blatantly unconstitutional laws that would have to be enforced 
by courts if judges were directed to ignore questions of constitu-
tionality.26 "From these, and many other selections which might 
be made," he concluded, "it is apparent, that the framers of the 
constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the gov-
ernment of courts, as well as of the legislature. "27 Marshall reiter-
ated this insistence that courts were not less responsible for the 
Constitution than the other branches and had concurrent consti-
tutional authority in his closing: a law repugnant to the Constitu-
tion is void, and "courts, as well as other departments, are bound 
by that instrument. "28 
There may be respects in which Marshall's reasoning in 
Marbury was unique,29 but they are small and unimportant and 
what truly stands out in the opinion is its lack of originality. Mar-
shall himself acknowledged as much, for he was being neither 
ironic nor misleading when he introduced the question of judi-
cial review by observing that it was "not of an intricacy propor-
tioned to its interest" and could be decided by "certain princi-
ples, supposed to have been long and well established. "30 
Marbury broke no new ground in the theory of judicial review. It 
simply reiterated the modest idea developed in the 1780s and es-
tablished in the 1790s: the judiciary was no less obligated than 
the other branches of government to take the Constitution into 
account, no less obligated to do its best to understand and follow 
the people's commands-always subject, however, like these 
23. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177-178. 
24. U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2. 
25. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179. 
26. /d. 
27. /d. at 179-80 (emphasis added). 
28. /d. at 180 (emphasis added). 
29. See SNOWISS, supra note 2, at 125, 139. 
30. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176. 
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other branches, to oversight from the body with ultimate inter-
pretive authority, "the people themselves." 
III. REJECTING JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
A puzzle remains. If not in Marbury, when did Americans 
begin to argue that constitutional disputes should ordinarily be 
resolved in litigation and that judicial decisions should be 
deemed to settle these disputes once and for all? According to 
some scholars, such ideas were not conceived until decades after 
Marbury, becoming respectable only in the 1820s or 1830s.31 
Others say the modern doctrine emerged later still, only after 
Reconstruction, in the 1870s and 1880s.32 In fact, the argument 
for judicial supremacy was fully developed by the mid-1790s, and 
understanding how and why it emerged-as well as how and why 
it was rejected-sheds additional light on Marbury and lends fur-
ther support to the revisionist reading of the case. 
A. FEDERALISM IN THE 1790s 
We like our Founding Fathers to be steady and heroic. We 
like to picture them having fully developed their theory of gov-
ernment by the time they wrote the Constitution, and we like to 
read what they said in ways that still seem attractive today. We 
also like to believe that our heroes did not change their minds 
simply because the Constitution was ratified and had to be put 
into effect. 
Of course, none of these things is true. The Founding Fa-
thers were still formulating their ideas about government when 
the opportunity to write a new Constitution presented itself. 
And not only were their partly-formed ideas distinctly unlike our 
ideas today, but the experience of actually governing continued 
to shape the Founders' thinking in ways that made these ideas 
unlike what they had been just a few years earlier. In the case of 
the Federalists, or those former Anti-Federalists who became 
Federalists, this meant a shift from moderate anxiety about the 
risks of republican politics to an extreme conservatism that 
swung sharply back toward the monarchical social order the 
Revolution had purported to abandon. 
31. See SNOWISS, supra note 2; G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND 
CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-1835, at 594 (1988) 
32. See MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960, at 19 (1992); WOLFE, supra note 2, at 4; ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. 
MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW X (1989). 
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Federalism was from the first a rejection of the unruly style 
of popular politics that Revolutionary leaders had practiced 
against England in the 1760s. It was an effort to preserve the 
tradition of deference that, in the eyes of the elite, was essential 
to keep republican politics from spinning out of control.33 
Somewhat muted in the 1780s, this mild conservatism became 
increasingly pronounced as time passed. Federalists never 
wanted to anoint a King or create a hereditary aristrocracy, as 
Republicans sometimes charged. But the "democracy" they be-
lieved in was, as Gordon Wood has put it, "a patrician-led classi-
cal democracy in which 'virtue exemplified in government will 
diffuse its salutary influence through[ out] the society. '"34 Feder-
alists witnessed the effects of the Revolution, observed their 
leadership being challenged by farmers, mechanics, and shop-
keepers, and did not like what they saw. 
In the Federalist world view, particularly as it emerged after 
ratification, ordinary citizens had no business tryin9 to influence 
the direction of government outside of election day. 5 Individuals 
might offer a "decent manly statement of opinion,"36 but free 
speech did not go so far as to include the right to publish some-
thing whose "professed design is the superintendence of [the] 
government" or whose "evident tendency, by obtaining an influ-
ence, is to lessen the power of officers of government, and to 
lead, or rather to drive, the legislature, where ever they 
please. "37 Such speech must be stopped, Samuel Kendal warned, 
lest it "prove destructive to 'liberty with order."'38 Oliver Wol-
cott went so far as to say it was "unlawful" for any group or or-
ganization to assemble "for the avowed purpose of a general in-
fluence and control upon the measures of government. "39 
Federalists recognized that they needed permission to rule, 
permission that had to be sought in free republican elections. 
But once this permission had been granted, ordinary citizens 
33. See DAVID HACKETI FISCHER, THE REVOLUTION OF AMERICAN 
CONSERVATISM 2-17 (1965); David Waldstrcicher, Federalism, the Styles of Politics, and 
the Politics of Style, in FEDERALISTS RECONSIDERED 99, 109-111 (Doron Ben Atar & 
Barbara B. Oberg eds. 1998); Wood, supra note 6, at 69. 
34. /d. at 83; Martin, supra note 11, at 130-76; Michael Les Benedict, The Jefferson-
ian Republicans and Civil Liberty, in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF LIBERTY 23 (1988). 
35. Martin, supra note 11, at 160-66. 
36. SAMUEL KENDAL, A SERMON DELIVERED ON THE DAY OF NATIONAL 
THANKSGIVING 30 (Samuel Hall 1795). 
37. To the Vigil, GAZETIE OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (Dec. 6, 1794). 
38. KENDAL, supra note 36, at 30. 
39. Quoted in 1 MEMOIRS OF THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND JOHN 
ADAMS 178, 179 (George Gibbs ed., 1846) (Oliver Wolcott, March 26, 1795). 
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were supposed to lose their political agency. "[T]he sovereignty 
of the people is delegated to those whom they have freely ap-
pointed to administer [the] constitution, and by them alone can 
be rightly exercised, save at the stated period of election, when 
the sovereignty is again at the disposal of the whole people."40 
Between elections, the people needed only to listen and to obey. 
Unity, "respectability," order, and, above all, reverence for 
"constituted authorities" were the hallmarks Federalists looked 
for in a well-functioning political system.41 
Particularly after 1793, as news spread of the Terror in 
France, this anxiety to contain popular politics veered toward 
hysteria. Federalists became obsessed with the need to make 
citizens show "respect" and "deference" and "obedience" to 
constituted authorities. Nathaniel Emmons preached a sermon 
in 1799 whose talk about what "subjects" owe their "rulers" 
makes Republican suspicions about the Federalists' monarchical 
aims appear almost reasonable: 
The duty of submission naturally results from the relations, 
which subjects bear to their rulers. There would be no propri-
ety in calling the body of the people subjects, unless they were 
under obligation to obey those in the administration of gov-
ernment. Every people, either directly or indirectly promise 
submission to their rulers. Those, who choose their civil mag-
istrates, do voluntarily pledge their obedience, whether they 
take the oath of allegiance or not. By putting power into the 
hands of their rulers, they put it out of their own; by choosing 
and authorizing them to govern, they practically declare, that 
they are willing to be governed; and by declaring their will-
ingness to be governed, they equally declare their intention 
and readiness to obey.42 
B. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 
With such a philosophy, in a world where ordinary citizens 
were increasingly vehement (and successful) in demanding to 
control their government, is it any wonder that Federalists began 
casting about for new ways to blunt popular participation? 
40. Order, COLUMBIAN CENTINEL 1 (Sept. 3, 1794). 
41. Waldstreicher, supra note 33, at 101, 109; Martin, supra note 11, at 143-52; 
Benedict, supra note 34, at 26-29. 
42. Nathaniel Emmons, A Discourse Delivered on the National Fast (1799), in 2 
AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1023, 1027 (Charles S. 
Hyneman & DonaldS. Lutz eds., 1983). 
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Within just a few years, they found themselves championing a 
novel and radically different role for courts. 
Though many examples could be cited to illustrate the 
change in Federalist thinking, James Kent's 1794 introductory 
law lectures are typical. Unlike earlier writers on judicial review, 
Kent (at the time a 31-year old novice law professor) placed 
great emphasis on the need for "the firmness and moderation of 
the Judicial department" to protect "the equal rights of a minor 
faction" from "the passions of a fierce and vindictive majority."43 
This fear of majority tyranny had always been a critical element 
of the Federalists' philosophy, but it had not previously been 
emphasized in connection with judicial review. Some earlier 
writers had referred in passing to problems of faction while dis-
cussing the courts' role in enforcing the Constitution, but their 
references were brief because earlier backers of judicial review 
were thinking mostly about legislative mistakes or efforts by le~­
islators to aggrandize their own power at the people's expense. 4 
That this should have been so is unsurprising given judicial re-
view's original basis in eighteenth-century forms of popular con-
stitutionalism and resistance. 
Kent, in contrast, made majority tyranny the heart of his ar-
gument for judicial review; and unlike prior writers, he offered it 
as the best and most important reason to prefer judges to legisla-
tors when it came to interpreting the Constitution. More even 
than this, Kent turned the fear of faction into an argument also 
against relying on "the force of public opinion": 
[S]ad experience has sufficiently taught mankind, that opinion 
is not an infallible standard of safety. When powerful rivalries 
prevail in the Community, and Parties become highly disci-
plined and hostile, every measure of the major part of the 
Legislature is sure to receive the sanction of that Party among 
their Constituents to which they belong. Every Step of the 
minor Party, it is equally certain will be approved by their 
immediate adherents, as well as indiscriminately misrepre-
sented or condemned by the prevailing voice.45 
This was different from, and more radical than, what courts 
and judges had been saying. Judicial review in Kent's hands was 
43. James Kent, An Introductory Lecture to a Court of Law Lectures, in id at 941. 
44. The only previous writer to make anything of the point was Alexander Hamil-
ton in Federalist 78, though even he offered it as a secondary justification, after protect-
mg the people from "legislative encroachments." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 9, 
at 527-28. 
45. Kent, supra note 43, at 942. 
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not a substitute for popular resistance that would be difficult to 
organize, nor was it a peaceful means of rendering such resis-
tance unnecessary. It was a check on the whims and caprice of an 
easily led mob. 
The polemical drift in Federalist thinking reflected in Kent's 
argument-a shift from seeing judicial review mainly as a device 
to protect the people from their governors, to viewing it first and 
foremost as a means of guarding the Constitution from the peo-
ple-might have been just a matter of time given the Federalists' 
general predilections and prejudices. A need for judicial review 
to serve as a check on faction, seen only hazily at first, could 
eventually have come into sharper focus no matter what. But po-
litical developments in the 1790s intervened to give this line of 
reasoning a powerful boost, generating (or perhaps merely ac-
celerating) a heightened appreciation among Federalists of the 
potential usefulness of courts in securing constitutional limits 
from the threat posed by a partisan majority. As the Federalists' 
naive expectation peaceably to govern a quiescent population 
collapsed amidst growing partisan acrimony, an enhanced role 
for courts protecting the Constitution from faction must have 
seemed obvious, almost natural-as if the federal judiciary had 
been deliberately constructed with precisely this purpose in 
mind. Courts, Kent concluded, because they are "organized with 
peculiar advantages to exempt them from the baneful influence 
of Faction," were "the most proper power in the Government 
to ... maintain the Authority of the Constitution."46 
This was so, Kent continued, for a second reason as well: 
separation of powers. The three departments of government, he 
observed, are kept "as far as possible separate and distinct" in 
order to prevent the introduction of "Tyranny into the Admini-
stration." It followed that interpretive authority should be vested 
exclusively in courts of law: 
[T]he interpretation or construction of the Constitution is as 
much a JUDICIAL act, and requires the exercise of the same 
LEGAL DISCRETION, as the interpretation or construction 
of a Law. The Courts are indeed bound to regard the Consti-
tution [as] what it truly is, a Law of the highest nature, to 
which every inferior derivative regulation must conform.47 
46. Id. at 942. 
47. /d. at 942-43. 
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Here was another newfound claim: a constitution is just so 
much ordinary law. And because constitutional interpretation is 
an ordinary judicial and legal act, it is not an act to be performed 
by legislative or executive officials. Judges, Kent repeated, are 
"the proper and intended Guardians of our limited Constitu-
tions. "48 
By the late 1790s, ideas such as these were no longer being 
expressed only by pamphleteers and politicians, some Federalist 
judges had begun voicing the new theory from the bench. Presid-
ing over the seditious libel prosecution of Matthew Lyon, Justice 
William Paterson instructed the jury that it could not pass on the 
constitutionality of the Sedition Act. Jurors must treat the law as 
valid, Paterson insisted, unless and until it was "declared null 
and void by a tribunal competent for the purpose. "49 Samuel 
Chase preached an even stronger line in charging a Pennsylvania 
Grand Jury. "The Judicial Power," he said, "are the only proper 
and competent authority to decide whether any Law made by 
Congress; or any of the State Legislatures is contrary to or in 
Violation of the federal Constitution. "5° Chase, too, was as good 
as his word when presiding at trial-lecturing John Fries that 
questions of constitutionality were the sole province of the judi-
ciary as he sentenced him to death for leading a mob protest 
against federal taxes,51 and refusing to permit Thomas Callen-
dar's defense attorney to argue to the jury the unconstitutional-
ity of the Sedition Act. 52 
Republicans were horrified. They were willing to acknowl-
edge that courts should take notice of the Constitution, but only 
within the terms of their departmental theory. Judicial interpre-
tations, on this view, had no more intrinsic weight than those of 
Congress or the executive, and all were subordinate to the "will 
of the community," which retained final interpretive authority. 
To say this authority was vested in life-tenured judges was to 
48. !d. at 944. 
49. FRANCIS WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE 
ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AI'D ADAMS 336 (1849). 
50. Samuel Chase's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District 
of Pennsylvania (April 12, 1800), in 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME 
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1800, at 408,412 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990) [here-
inafter cited as DHSCJ. 
51. See WHARTON, supra note 49, at 637-38; STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC 
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 696-99 (1993). 
52. See 3 DHSC, supra note 50, at 405; JAMES HAW, STORMY PATRIOT: THE LIFE 
OF SAMUEL CHASE 203-06 (1980). 
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contradict and repudiate the republican nature of American 
government. 
This split in views was nowhere more apparent than in the 
controversy over the Alien and Sedition Acts. The Republican-
controlled legislatures of Virginia and Kentucky sought to rouse 
opposition to the acts by promulgating resolutions calling upon 
the states jointly to urge federal lawmakers to repeal the offend-
ing laws. Federalist-dominated legislatures in ten of the fourteen 
other states opposed their efforts, with several insisting that 
"state legislatures are not the proper tribunals to determine the 
constitutionality of the laws of the general government" because 
"the duty of such decision is properly and exclusively confided to 
the judicial department."53 James Madison offered the Republi-
can reply to these claims of judicial supremacy in his famous Re-
port of 1800 for the legislature of Virginia, which denied "that 
the judicial authority is to be regarded as the sole expositor of 
the constitution" and reasserted the theory of departmentalism 
and the principle of popular constitutionalism.54 "The authority 
of constitutions over governments, and of the sovereignty of the 
people over constitutions," Madison urged, "are truths which are 
at all times necessary to be kept in mind." 
With lines thus clearly drawn between a Republican Consti-
tution and a Federalist one, the two parties squared off in the 
election of 1800. This pivotal contest exhibited something rarely 
seen in national elections in the United States: a choice between 
well-defined alternatives, both clear and clearly understood. 
Like the question of a national bank in 1832 or the New Deal in 
1936, Republicans and Federalists in 1800 offered the public 
sharply drawn, alternative visions of the Constitution. And the 
Federalists were decisively, indeed, overwhelmingly, repudi-
ated.55 The American public, or at least that portion of it permit-
ted to vote, opted for Republican principles and the Republican 
understanding of constitutionalism. So complete was the rout 
53. Answers of the Several State Legislatures, in 4 JONATHON ELLIOT, THE 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS AND THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 538, 539 (1888 ed.) (New Hampshire); see also id. at 533 
(Rhode Island), 539 (Vermont). 
54. Report on the Alien and Sedition Acts (Jan. 7, 1800), in JAMES MADISON: 
WRITINGS 608,613 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999). 
55. Because of peculiarities in the way electors were chosen, the best measure of 
how sweeping a victory Jefferson's party had won is found in elections to the House of 
Representatives. Going into the election, Federalists held 63 seats to the Republicans' 43. 
The vote in 1800 more than reversed these numbers, leaving the Republicans with a 65-
41 edge and a clear mandate to change the government's direction. See MANNING J. 
DAUER, THE ADAMS FEDERALISTS 273,274 tbls. 21 & 22 (1953). 
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that Jefferson's party would dominate American politics for the 
next generation. 
C. THE REPEAL DEBATE AND THE DEATH OF FEDERALISM 
Federalists made one last stab at selling their vision of the 
judicial power to the American people, during the fight over re-
peal of the Judiciary Act of 1801. This closely watched contest 
reprised and elaborated the arguments made in the late 1790s. 
Both sides detailed their views in greater depth than before, ex-
posing how far apart their respective positions had become. It 
was, as it turned out, the last gasp of what we might call the first 
Federalism movement, at least as an intellectual force. 56 
Treating repeal as a thinly disguised effort to destroy judi-
cial independence, Federalist speakers urged the necessity of an 
effective judicial check on Congress and on politics generally. 
Predictably, their first concern was for preserving order. Judicial 
supremacy was imperative, they said, because the alternative was 
violence and bloodshed. "What security is there to an individual, 
if the Legislature of the Union or any particular State, should 
pass [an unconstitutional] law?" asked Uriah Tracy in the Sen-
ate. "None in the world but by an appeal to the Judiciary of the 
United States, where he will obtain a decision that the law itself 
is unconstitutional and void, or by a resort to revolutionary prin-
ciples, and exciting a civil war."57 Roger Griswold made the 
same argument while avoiding histrionics. Everyone on both 
sides conceded that some kind of check on Congress was 
needed, he observed, and "[i]f this power of checking the uncon-
stitutional acts of the Legislature is necessary, where can it re-
side with so much propriety as in your courts?"58 
56. On the disillusionment of these first generation Federalists after 1800, see 
LINDA K. KERBER, FEDERALISTS IN DISSENT: IMAGERY AND IDEOLOGY IN 
JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1970). David Hackett Fisher and, more recently, Marshall 
Foletta have, in different ways, described the efforts of next generation Federalists to 
reinvent themselves-Fisher in politics, where they had little success, and Foletta in intel-
lectual pursuits, where their impact was somewhat greater. FISCHER, supra note 33; 
MARSHALL FOLETTA, COMING TO TERMS WITH DEMOCRACY: FEDERALIST 
INTELLECTUALS AND THE SHAPII\G OF AN AMERICAN CULTURE (2001). Daniel Hulse-
basch depicts the later Federalists' quite substantial success in changing the legal profes-
sion and practice of law. See DANIEL 1. HULSEBOSCH, CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW 
YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATIOI" OF FEDERALISM IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD chs. 7-8 
(forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with author). 
57. Speech by Uriah Tracy, 11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 56. 
58. Speech by Roger Griswold, in id. at 783. 
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With the people themselves, answered Republicans-a re-
ply that seemed to infuriate Federalists. "Not so, sir, is the case 
with us," John Rutledge, Jr., snarled: 
[W]e do not wish to guard the Constitution by appeals to the 
people; we will do nothing calculated to produce insurrection; 
we do not want to protect the great charter of our rights by 
the bayonet. No, sir, we rely on honest and legitimate means 
of defence; we wish to check these gentlemen only with Con-
stitutional checks. 59 
And "Constitutional checks," Rutledge and numerous other 
Federalists made clear, meant primarily, and ultimately, the ju-
diciary. 
Gouverneur Morris offered the most strongly worded de-
fense of judicial supremacy. A number of Republicans suggested 
that judicial review lacked any constitutional basis. "If it is de-
rived from the Constitution," said John Breckinridge, "I ask gen-
tlemen to point out the clause which grants it. I can find no such 
grant. "60 Most Federalists responded by citing precedent or by 
pointing to the Supremacy Clause or to the clause that grants ju-
risdiction over cases "arising under" the Constitution.61 But 
Morris was too exasperated by this point to worry about techni-
calities: 
And he asks where judges got their pretended power of decid-
ing on the constitutionality of laws? If it be in the Constitution 
(says he) let it be pointed out. I answer, they derived that 
power from authority higher than this Constitution. They de-
rive it from the constitution of man, from the nature of things, 
from the necessary progress of human affairs. When you have 
enacted a law, when process thereon has been issued, and suit 
brought, it becomes eventually necessary that the judges de-
cide on the case before them, and declare what the law is. 
They must, of course, determine whether that which is pro-
duced and relied on, has indeed the binding force of law. The 
decision of the Supreme Court is, and, of necessity, must be 
final. This, Sir, is the principle, and the source of the right for 
which we contend.62 
59. Speech by John Rutledge, Jr., in id. at 743. 
60. Speech of John Brcckinridge, in id. at 179. 
61. See, e.g., Speech by Calvin Goddard, in id. at 727; Speech by Roger Griswold, in 
id. at 783; Speech by Samuel Dana, in id. at 920-26. 
62. Speech of Gouverneur Morris, in id. at 180. 
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Of course, most Federalists-including Morris in his calmer 
moments-defended judicial review without invoking "the con-
stitution of man," by repeating the same argument that had been 
made since the 1780s: courts had a duty to "pronounce on the 
validity of acts of Congress" because the Constitution is "para-
mount, and limits as well the power of the Legislature as the 
power of the court. "63 
What Federalists now added to this familiar argument, re-
flecting concerns like those that had motivated James Kent, was 
an insistence that "the Judiciary decide at last, and their decision 
[be] final," 64 together with an emphasis on faction and majority 
tyranny by way of justification. "Legislatures will, in violent 
times, enact laws manifestly unjust, oppressive, and unconstitu-
tional," explained Calvin Goddard, "and that, too, under the 
specious pretext of relieving the burdens of the people. Such 
laws, it is the business of the judges, elevated above the influence 
of party, to control. "65 
For just this reason, Federalists argued, in 1788 the people 
of America "had vested in the judges a check ... a check of the 
first necessity, to prevent an invasion of the Constitution by un-
constitutional laws-a check which might prevent any faction 
from intimidating or annihilating the tribunals themselves."66 
John Rutledge, Jr., said much the same, insisting that the federal 
judiciary had been specifically and self-consciously "designed" to 
control what the legislature and executive might do to the Con-
stitution.67 This was pure revisionism, of course; in fact, very lit-
tle attention or emphasis had been given to judicial review when 
the Constitution was written and ratified. But things looked dif-
ferent now. Speaking for his party, Rutledge waxed poetic in 
limning the new Federalist consensus on the centrality of courts 
in the scheme of the Constitution: 
We say it is the sheet-anchor which will enable us to ride out 
the tornado and the tempest, and that if we part from it there 
is no safety left; that it is the only thing which can preserve us 
from the perilous lee-shore, the rocks and the quicksands, 
where all other Republics have perished. The Judiciary is the 
63. Speech of Samuel Dana, in id. at 920; speech of Roger Griswold, in id. at 783; 
see also, e.g., speech of Joseph Hemphill, in id. at 542; speech of Calvin Goddard, in id. at 
727-28. 
64. Speech of Joseph Hemphill, in id. at 543. 
65. Speech of Calvin Goddard, in id. at 728. 
66. Speech by Gouverneur Morris, in id. at 38. 
67. Speech by John Rutledge, Jr., in id. at 743. 
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ballast of the national ship; throw it overboard and she must 
upset. 68 
Republicans answered these arguments, of course, laying 
out their own, alternative vision of popular constitutionalism and 
departmentalism. But the issue was never seriously in doubt. Jef-
ferson's party was firmly in control, and repeal of the Judiciary 
Act was actually quite popular.69 The vote was close in the Sen-
ate, reflecting electoral lag due to its staggered terms rather than 
real political strength. 70 More indicative of public sentiment was 
the vote in the House, where the measure carried by almost 2-
1.71 More indicative still was the public's total indifference to 
Federalist efforts to arouse indignation over repeal or to make it 
an issue in the 1802 midterm elections. Rather than being dis-
credited, Republicans gained ground everywhere in the country 
except for a single district in Delaware.72 
IV. REAPPRAISING MARBURY 
Understanding this background helps us to resolve several 
questions about Marbury that have long puzzled commentators. 
A. THE DECISION TO ADDRESS JUDICIAL REVIEW 
It helps us understand, first, why the Court stretched as hard 
as it did to address the matter of judicial review. Everyone who 
teaches Marbury loves pointing out to students how easily Mar-
shall could have reached the same result in the case-that the 
Court lacked original jurisdiction to entertain Marbury's peti-
tion-by interpreting the Judiciary Act not to authorize writs of 
mandamus unless the Court otherwise had jurisdiction.73 Mar-
68. /d. 
69. GEORGE LEE HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNS0:-1, 2 THE OLIVER WENDELL 
HOLMES DEVISE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT- FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN 
MARSHALL, 1801-1815, at 156-63 (1981). 
70. See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN 
THE YOUNG REPUBLIC 47-51 (1971). 
71. See 11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 982 (repeal approved by a vote of 
59-32). 
72. See DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON THE PRESIDENT: FIRST TERM, 1801-1805, at 
140-41 (1970). 
73. Indeed, this was a stronger legal position than the one Marshall actually took, 
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Congress from enlarging the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction was anything but ob-
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shall plainly decided to force the question of review. But why, 
particularly at this highly charged moment, when the Supreme 
Court's political position was so precarious? 
The answer may be that the very precariousness of the 
Court's position is what led Marshall to do something about ju-
dicial review. The repeal of the Judiciary Act had been a major 
blow to the federal courts, but the Republicans' anger was not 
yet sated. In the course of debating repeal, the concept of judi-
cial review had been attacked in words and with a ferocity not 
heard since before the Constitution was adopted; a few Republi-
cans had gone so far as to question its existence in any form and 
on any terms. 74 Suddenly, a practice that had seemed so uncon-
troversial throughout the 1790s no longer seemed immune to at-
tack. 
Most Republicans were not prepared to reject judicial re-
view outright-not yet, at least. Most, including the President 
himself, accepted the more moderate departmental theory and 
were willing to live with review on its limited terms. This was the 
moment, Marshall apparently decided, to make a statement: be-
fore more extreme sentiments against judicial authority spread 
and grew into something more threatening. Yet such a statement 
would be effective only if the Court could make it in a way that 
dampened rather than inflamed further hostility. Marshall's goal 
was, in effect, to get judicial review into the record. Not to create 
it, for it already existed, but to deflect an incipient movement to 
delegitimize it. Dean Alfange captured the likely drift of Mar-
shall's thinking thus: 
[I]t was important to invoke the power of judicial review in 
order to establish a precedent for its later use and to include 
in the Reports of the Supreme Court a statement of the rea-
soning by which the power could be shown to be absolutely 
necessary. Thus, since judicial review could not safely have 
been used to invalidate a law that the Republicans cared 
about, it was necessary to find a law that the Republicans did 
not care about. And what more perfect law could have been 
SUPREME COURT 167-70 (2001). 
74. See id. at 167; Ellis, supra note 70, at 58; 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME 
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 215-16 (1922). For examples of speeches denounc-
ing judicial review, see Speech by Stevens Thomas Mason, 11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra 
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found for this purpose than § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789? 75 
We cannot judge whether Marshall's gambit was necessary, 
because we do not know how judicial review might have fared 
without Marbury. Maybe Marshall's fears were overstated. 
Maybe judicial review would have continued to evolve as it did 
without this push from the Court. Or maybe not. At the very 
least, it seems fair to say, by asserting and exercising the power 
of judicial review at just this moment, Marshall may have helped 
to preserve a practice that could otherwise have been forced 
down a dead end road. 
B. THE RETREAT FROM JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 
At just this moment, but also in just this way. For the lan-
guage Marshall used to justify judicial review is also quite tell-
ing-especially against the background of the public's decisive 
rejection of the Federalist argument for judicial supremacy. That 
Marshall personally believed in the Court's supremacy seems 
clear.76 Yet in writing Marbury, Marshall conspicuously and self-
consciously shied away from saying anything that could be read 
to endorse such an idea. None of the by-then common argu-
ments that had been made by Federalists since the mid-1790s are 
found in Marbury. Nowhere does Marshall say, as James Kent 
did, that courts were "the most proper power in the Government 
to ... maintain the Authority of the Constitution"77 or that "the 
interpretation or construction of the Constitution ... requires 
the exercise of the same LEGAL DISCRETION, as the inter-
pretation or construction of a Law."78 Nowhere does he assert, 
like Calvin Goddard, that "it is the business of the judges, ele-
vated above the influence of party, to control" the other 
branches of government.79 Nor does he even hint, as Samuel 
Chase had said explicitly in 1800, that courts are "the only 
proper and competent authority to decide whether any Law 
made by Congress" is constitutional,80 much less that a decision 
75. Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial 
Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. Cr. REV. 329,367-68. 
76. See M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,401 (1819); [John Marshall] 
A Friend of the Constitution !X, ALEXANDRIA GAZETIE (July 15, 1819), in GERALD 
GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 138 (1969). 
77. Kent, supra note 43, at 942. 
78. !d. at 942-43. 
79. Speech of Calvin Goddard, in 11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 728. 
80. Samuel Chase's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District 
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of the Supreme Court "is, and, of necessity, must be final," as 
Gouverneur Morris asserted during the debate over repeal. 81 
Instead of saying anything that might smack of these un-
popular Federalist ideas, Marshall carefully and deliberately 
used only comfortable and familiar Republican arguments and 
Republican language. In most important respects, his opinion 
simply parroted arguments made by the Virginia judges in Kam-
per v. Hawkins, especially in emphasizing that the Court's power 
was concurrent with that of the other branches, that "courts, as 
well as other departments" could engage in constitutional inter-
pretation. Marshall thus justified judicial review in terms that 
Republican moderates not only could accept, but with which 
they agreed. 
Among these moderates was Thomas Jefferson, who was 
greatly vexed by the lecture Marshall gave him in dictum but 
who had nothing bad to say about the Court's discussion of judi-
cial review. This was not because, as conventional wisdom has 
long held, Marshall cleverly chose to exercise review in the ser-
vice of scaling back the Court's jurisdiction. Jefferson was not 
stupid. He was perfectly capable of anticipating and appreciating 
that other uses could be made of judicial review. But he also was 
not opposed to it-not in the modest form presented by Mar-
shall in Marbury. 
Bottom line: read in context, Marshall's opinion in Marbury 
cannot possibly be used as authority for judicial supremacy. 
Quite the opposite, it was an abandonment of the idea and an 
endorsement of the Jeffersonian theory of departmentalism. The 
current Supreme Court could hardly be more wrong when it 
cites Marbury as authority to reject that very theory. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE 
FOR POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Given the American people's overwhelming rejection of ju-
dicial supremacy, one might have expected the idea to expire 
with the Federalist Party. But it never disappeared entirely. The 
very diffuseness and decentralization of popular constitutional-
ism made it possible for advocates of judicial authority to con-
tinue nursing their claims. Driven out of respectable public de-
bate for a time, the idea of judicial supremacy eventually 
of Pennsylvania (April12, 1800), in 3 DHSC, supra note 50, at 412. 
81. Speech of Gouverneur Morris, in 11 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 16, at 180. 
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reemerged from hibernation. Popular constitutionalism and ju-
dicial supremacy then shared space in American political cul-
ture, co-existing in an uncertain and sometimes tense relation-
ship. The result was a dialectical tug of war that continues even 
today. 
How this happened and how it has played out over time is a 
long and complicated story, told elsewhere.82 Here, we need say 
only the following: For most of American history, popular con-
stitutionalism probably reflected the dominant public under-
standing, and it was the clear victor each time matters came to a 
head, as they did, for example, in 1832, in 1857, and in 1937. 
Whether popular constitutionalism would still prevail today-
whether the American people in 2003 would follow their for-
bears by insisting on their right to control the Constitution, or 
would instead hand control over to what Martin Van Buren once 
condemned as "the selfish and contracted rule of a judicial oli-
garchy"83 -seems an open question. We should, however, at 
least recognize that the question is open. Judicial supremacy is 
not the logical or inevitable product of experience and progress. 
It remains now, as it was in the beginning, but one side in a re-
current and ongoing struggle to determine the proper role of or-
dinary citizens in a republic. 
82. Readers who have made it this far will, hopefully, find themselves intrigued 
enough to read THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (forthcoming Oxford, 2004), wh1ch more fully recounts the h1stoncal 
course of debates about judicial review and judicial supremacy from the Revolution until 
today. 
83. MARTIN VAN BUREN, INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND COURSE OF POLITICAL 
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